Accountability and Legislative Staffing

The Legislature is the most accountable branch of government. Although some may say that the Legislature is out of touch with the people, my experience has been just the opposite. Constituents have a great deal of power within state capitols, particularly if they speak up. Even when constituents are silent, a typical legislative office spends a significant amount of time thinking about the impact decisions may have upon constituents. Accountability to the electorate is a concept that permeates the entire legislative institution.

This level of accountability plays an important role in distinguishing the Legislature from the Executive branch. Political scientists and economists have lamented the lack of market competition in government service, arguing that the result is costly, poor quality services. While this sentiment may have some validity for executive branch bureaucracies, I believe the high level of accountability in the Legislature can act as a surrogate for market competition. In the Legislature, the level of concern devoted to constituents is similar to the level of concern that private sector professionals devote to their clients. At at some level, constituents have the authority to fire the legislator, much like clients have the authority to fire their lawyer or accountant. The market, in a sense, is alive and well when it comes to the Legislature.

All of this can make the Legislature a top choice for individuals seeking a public service career. In the private sector, you get the productivity and excitement that comes with being accountable to your customer base but, in the end, you may just be working to earn a buck. In the typical executive branch bureaucracy, you get the satisfaction of working in the public interest but, in the end, you may have to deal with a complacent workplace that is not particularly concerned with customer satisfaction. However, in the Legislature, you get the productivity and excitement that comes with being directly accountable to your constituents, together with the satisfaction of working in the public interest.

Lords and Senators

Britain's House of Lords makes for an interesting contrast with the typical American Senate, and now it looks like the House of Lords may become a wee bit more like it's American cousin.

The House of Lords has the following characteristics, among others:

• 746 members (107 more than the House of Commons)
• About 600 members appointed for life
• No directly elected members
• 26 members appointed by virtue of their position as the most important or longest serving clergy in the Church of England
• The house generally has only limited authority to delay legislation and no authority to reject legislation originating in the lower house
• In some cases, the assent of the House of Lords is not required at all for legislation to pass

But the House of Lords is now the subject of a reform movement to make it more democratic (http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8675277), with one version of the reform plan calling for 50% of the members to be popularly elected. Check out these comments from the Economist article:

“Even electing 50% of the Lords would completely ruin it,” argues Lord Lipsey, a
Labour peer who once worked at The Economist. The expertise gathered in the
Lords would, he says, be impossible to replicate with elections. Lord Steel, a
former leader of the Liberal Democrats, also argues that the Lords should be
appointed from among the eminent in different walks of life, even though his
party has long wanted to make the place democratic . . .

Life terms for legislators. Now, there's an idea that is foreign to the American way of doing legislative business. I know, some in the campaign finance reform crowd would say we have de facto life terms as it is. But anyone who has spent time in and around an American legislature knows that the election cycle is a powerful constitutional tool for enhancing accountability. Elections matter to legislators. And if you think they don't matter to the people, try advocating life terms for your state senate. Even on the merits of it, would life appointments for "eminent" individuals really add to the quality of lawmaking? Given the lack of accountability such a system would support, I can see why the House of Lords generally doesn't have authority to stop legislation originating in the popularly elected House of Commons.

Legislator Pay

On Tuesday, the Council of State Governments released the results of a nationwide study of state legislator pay. A copy of the report may be purchased here: http://storefront.csg.org/index.asp?PageAction=VIEWPROD&ProdID=66. According to a story published on Stateline.org (http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=179978), it appears as though most salaries have not kept pace with inflation over the last 20 years. Here are some of the more interesting findings:

• In 28 states, lawmaker salaries declined when adjusted for inflation.
• The average salary in the 9 legislatures classified as full-time was $67,077. Exclude California's $110,880 salary, and the average drops to $61,601. Of the 9 full-time legislatures, 4 are Eastern states, 4 are Midwestern states, and one, California, is a Western state.
• The average salary in the 23 states classified as having lawmakers working at least two-thirds of full-time, but less than full-time, was $22,907. This average equates to a full-time salary of $34,343.

These findings raise several important questions about the operations of state legislatures.

What impact do these salaries have on candidate recruitment? The author of the report argues that we should expect the political parties to have difficulty recruiting candidates when potential candidates can earn more money in other professions. This concern may be valid, although there are certainly those who would turn down higher salaries in other occupations for the unique variety of non-monetary benefits of serving in the legislature. Such non-monetary benefits include the ability to work in a leadership role within the community, the ability to help others, and the ability to determine public policy. This is not to say that the money is unimportant; rather, that there surely are other factors that play an important role in a citizen's decision to run for legislative office.

What impact do these salaries have on the representative characteristics of the legislature? There likely is some point at which legislative pay is so low as to result in an increase in independently wealthy individuals and retirees running for office. Presumably, this result is more likely in states where the time demands of legislative office are greater, making it less possible for legislators to maintain careers outside of the legislature.

What impact do these salaries have on the competency of legislators? It may be argued that low pay results in individuals of lesser talent running for office. If this argument were correct, one would expect contemporary legislators to be less talented and capable than those of the mid-1970's. After all, salaries have declined in many states when adjusted for inflation. From my experience, this argument just doesn't ring true. The lawmakers of today are no less capable than those of the mid-1970's and, in many cases, are probably more able to handle the complex problems presented by contemporary lawmaking.

What impact do the salaries have on management within legislative institutions? In those legislatures with professional staff, it is likely that the staff in many cases earns a higher salary than the elected officials for whom they work. This circumstance is not unique in legislative service. For example, local elected school boards earn less pay than the school administrators they employ. However, it poses problems with regard to accountability.

In a typical workplace, those with more authority and responsibility are compensated at a higher rate, with the individuals in leadership positions earning the highest pay. Thus, pay becomes a symbol of worth to and sway within the organization. To some extent, the pay reinforces the organizational protocols. In legislatures, this dynamic is put on its head because the boss often earns less than his or her staff. Although it is important to compensate professional legislative staff competitively with executive and judicial branch positions, the gap in pay between legislative staff and those whom they support must be understood and managed. For example, structures must be put in place to ensure that staff remain accountable to the elected officials, particularly if the staff are organized bureaucratic legislative agencies. One would expect these accountability structures to be even more necessary as the gap between legislator and staff pay widens.